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I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose you would like to purchase an airline ticket.
Realizing that electronic tickets are usually cheaper and
more convenient, you decide to book your flight online.
You boot up your computer to access the Internet, double-
click on the "Internet Explorer" icon, and access your
homepage. You type in your favorite airline travel
agent's web address, and press enter. However, when the
page is displayed, instead of providing intelligible infor-
mation, the web page displays the following: "Blank,
blank, blank;" "tab, tab, tab;". "graphic spacer, graphic
spacer graphic 1234393.gif "I
You think this is strange and attempt to access other
sites, but you find the same results. You then decide to
hop in your car and drive down to the local travel
agency to purchase a ticket. However, when you get to
the travel agent's office, there is no door. No door! This
seems ludicrous of course, because anyone who would de-
sign a building would think it necessary to include a
door. You think: "How could this travel agent possibly
conduct business without a door to his building?"
Alfred Hitchcock would find these results normal.
However, most people would be disheartened and even
I See Neal Ewers, Screen Readers and the Web, 2, at http://
www.doit.wisc.edu/accessibility/video/transcript2.doc
(2002) [hereinafter Screen Readers and the Web] (providing ex-
amples of encrypted language in a website).
2 A "text label" is a word designation for a hyperlink on a
website providing the meaning and purpose of the hyperlink.
See generally Curtis Chong, Web Accessibility: Making Your Web-
site Accessible to the Blind, at http://www.nfb.org/tech/webacc.
htm (last modified July 2, 2002) (offering tips on achieving
accessibility on a website).
3 See Screen Readers and the Web, supra note I (providing a
video and its transcript explaining the barriers encountered
by people who use screen readers when navigating the In-
ternet).
4 See, e.g., John Heim and Judy Heim, People with Disabili-
ties Reach for Web Access, PCWORLD.COM, at http://w%w.pc
world.com/news/article/0,aid,10362,00.asp (Apr. 1, 1999)
(describing how an individual with a vision impairment may
angered at the inability to access the travel agency, either
electronically or physically. The architect of a building
would not think twice about the necessity of a door, but
the door may only be accessible after ascending several
steps. The steps could preclude a person with a mobility
impairment from accessing the service.
The travel agency webpage display used above can be
what happens when a blind person accesses a website
without text labels2 identifying items on the site.3 A per-
son with a visual impairment or a physical disability
may use a peripheral device known as a screen reader
that will read the text on a website and either translates
it into digital speech or Braille to allow the person to
navigate the site.4 However, when a screen reader comes
upon a picture or a hyperlink to another site, without
labels describing the function or content of the item, the
screen reader may only read "1234393.gif' or "blank."
Similar to the inaccessibility of the travel agency with
steps in front of it, a blind person may be precluded from
navigating the travel agency website. Not only is the
blind person unable to purchase an airline ticket, but the
travel agency loses a customer that it never knew it had.5
The Internet is a popular, useful, and essential
tool that is becoming increasingly necessary for
use a screen reader to operate a computer or to navigate the
web); see a/soJudy Heim, Locking out the Disabled, PC WORLD,
Sept. 2000, at 182 ("These shopping services are so important
for people who are unable to drive, and for those of us who
are unable to peruse the aisles.").
5 See Courtney Mecavinta, W3C, Others Seek Accessible Web,
CNET NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-2253
38.html (May 4, 1999) (discussing the website navigation ex-
periences of Doug Wakefield, a blind Internet user, as well as
a technology specialist for the United States Access Board, an
independent federal agency that issues accessibility stan-
dards). The author explains that "[i]f a site is built right,
[Wakefield or other disabled individuals] can wade through
articles, search for information, and make purchases. How-
ever, if a site doesn't consider that some visitors are hearing,
visually, or physically impaired, it could be turning away
scores of users like Wakefield." Wakefield, quoted in the arti-
cle, states "[i]f a site is accessible, it gets my dollars." Id.
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daily living.6 However, many potential Internet
users are precluded from utilizing its wealth of in-
formation, products, and services because a num-
ber of websites are inaccessible. 7 Disabled users
and elderly users, especially those who may have
vision impairments, find themselves unable to
even enter the "door" of a website. s Many elec-
tronic barriers exist on the Internet, not unlike ar-
chitectural barriers that exist in the physical
world.9
Although laws proscribe discrimination against
persons with disabilities, there is much confusion
regarding how these same laws apply in the non-
physical world of the Internet.10 Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("Title
III") prohibits discrimination against persons with
disabilities in "places of public accommodation."II It is
unclear, however, whether a place of public accom-
modation, such as a travel agent's office, also in-
cludes a non-physical place of public accommodation,
such as a travel agent's website.
This Comment examines the application of Ti-
tle III to the Internet. Part II examines the history
of disability discrimination and the application of
this problem to the Internet in light of statistical
evidence. It also examines interpretations of the
applicability of Title III to the Internet by federal
circuit courts and the Department ofJustice. Part
II concludes that conflict exists among the federal
appellate courts and that the Supreme Court
needs to resolve this confusion. Part III provides
6 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-51 (1997)
(providing a thorough explanation of the history, structure,
and capabilities of the Internet). The Supreme Court also
emphasizes the utilitarian breadth of the Internet in Ashcroft
v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002).
7 See generally Cynthia D. Waddell, The Growing Digital Di-
vide In Access for People with Disabilities: Overcoming Barriers to
Participation, at http://www.icdri.org/CynthiaW/the_digital_
divide.htm (May 25 & 26, 1999) [hereinafter The Growing Dig-
ital Divide] (finding that the use of graphics and tables with-
out accessibility functions can create electronic barriers for
persons who use screen-readers to navigate the Internet).
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See generally id.
11 Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. §§12181-12189 (2000) (emphasis added). Title III
provides as a general rule, "[n]o individual shall be discrimi-
nated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, or accommodations of any place of public accommoda-
tion by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or oper-
ates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. §12182(a).
12 See 42 U.S.C. §12102(2) (providing the statutory defi-
nition in the ADA of disability as "a physical or mental im-
arguments for the application of Title III to the
Internet. Part III.A provides that the Internet is
subject to the non-discrimination mandates of Ti-
tle III, and that any contrary interpretation would
frustrate the plain language and defeat the pur-
pose of the statute. This Comment also finds Ti-
tle III to be constitutional as applied to the In-
ternet. Part III.B finds that Title III is a permissi-
ble exercise of Congress' commerce power as ap-
plied to the Internet. Finally, Part III.C finds that
Title III as applied to the Internet does not violate
the First Amendment to the Constitution.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM:
DISCRIMINATION, LEGISLATION, AND
THEIR MANIFESTATION
A. History of Discrimination on the Basis
of Disability
History is replete with instances of overt dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities. 12
However, discrimination can be more passive and
less obvious, permeating many aspects of a dis-
abled individual's daily activities. 13 Often the dis-
criminator is not even aware that he or she is dis-
criminating. 14
Historically, social and legislative endeavors
have sought to proscribe discriminatory activities
against "discrete and insular minorit[ies]" such as
persons with disabilities.1 5 In particular, the Disa-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual . . . a record of such an im-
pairment . . . or being regarded as having such an impair-
ment"). See generally THE DISABILITY SociAL HISTORY PROJECT,
DISABILIrY HISTORY TIMELINE, at http://www.disabilityhistory.
org/timeline_new.html (last modified Sept. 23, 2003) (pro-
viding a brief history of the disability rights movement). His-
torically, disability discrimination has been pervasive in the
United States and internationally. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (holding a Virginia statute au-
thorizing the forced sterilization of persons with disabilities
not a violation of due process or equal protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment). Specifically, the Buck
Court found "[i]t is better for all the world, if... society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their
kind .... Three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id at
207.
13 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 29 (1990) (of-
fering numerous examples of discrimination against persons
with disabilities in various aspects of life).
14 See generally The Growing Digital Divide, supra note 7
(discussing passive discrimination on the Internet).
15 Congress has sought to protect select groups of indi-
viduals from discriminatory treatment based solely on status.
Among these status positions are persons with disabilities. 42
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bility Rights Movement, which has relied heavily
on the Civil Rights Movement, developed in re-
sponse to pervasive discrimination.' 6 The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination
or segregation on the basis of "race, color, relig-
ion, or national origin," 17 provided the framework
for disability rights legislation such as the Rehabil-
itation Act of 197318 and the ADA. 1
Among the landmark disability rights laws is
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
("Section 504"), which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of disability in programs that receive
federal financial assistance.2 0 The ADA's non-dis-
crimination mandates are based on Section 504
and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 The ADA essen-
tially extends Section 504's non-discrimination
mandate beyond federal agencies and recipients
of federal financial assistance to state and local
governments, public transportation entities, and
private entities holding themselves out to the pub-
lic while engaged in commerce. 22
Federal government agencies are also bound by
electronic access non-discrimination mandates.
On July 21, 2001, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
was amended, making federal agencies responsi-
ble for providing accessible websites. Section 508
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 508")
requires that all electronic and information tech-
nologies that federal agencies develop, procure,
maintain, or use must be usable by persons with
U.S.C. §12101 (a) (7).
16 See generally THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, NATIONAL
MUSEUM OF AMERICAN HISTORY VIRTUAL EXHIBITION, THE Dis-
ABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT, at http://americanhistory.si.edu/
disabilityrights/exhibit.html (2000).
17 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000a(a)
(2000).
I8 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§701, 794(a)
(2000) (prohibiting discrimination against persons with disa-
bilities by federal government agencies and recipients of fed-
eral financial assistance).
19 See 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2 (providing a history of disability rights legisla-
tion).
20 29 U.S.C. §794 (prohibiting discrimination by federal
agencies).
21 See H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt. 2.
22 See 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213.
23 See §508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§794d (2000).
24 See Electronic and Information Technology Accessibil-
ity Standards, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,500 (Dec. 21, 2000). The Ac-
cess Board, an independent federal agency, provides the
standards for electronic and information technology accessi-
bility pursuant to Section 508. See The Architectural Barriers
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §4151 (2000). The Access Board was
disabilities in a manner that is comparable to non-
disabled users, unless an undue burden would re-
sult.2 3 This mandate proscribes discrimination
against both federal government employees seek-
ing to access information technologies and mem-
bers of the public soliciting information from fed-
eral agencies.2 4
The ADA prohibits both overt and passive dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities.2 5 In
enacting the ADA, Congress found that "histori-
cally, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and despite some im-
provements, such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a seri-
ous and pervasive social problem ... persisting in
such critical areas as .. .public accommodations,
education ... [and] communication." 26 The pur-
poses of the ADA are:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a cen-
tral role in enforcing the standards established in this
Act on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, in-
cluding the power to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment and to regulate commerce, in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities.
27
Although existing statutes, such as the ADA, pro-
established under Section 502 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. §792 (2000). See generally The Access Board,
at-http://www.access-board.gov (last visited Mar. 25, 2003);
see also Steve Mendelsohn and Ron Hager, Access to Informa-
tion and Electronic Technology Offered by the U.S. Government, Sec-
tion 508 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act, 6 ADVOCATE 1 (Na-
tional Assistive Technology Advocacy Project, Buffalo, N.Y.),
Jan./Mar. 2001 (providing a detailed examination of the en-
tities covered by Section 508 as well as exemptions from the
law); just as Section 504 set the stage for the passage of the
ADA, some argue that Section 508 sets the stage for enforce-
ment of the ADA or a future statutory amendment to the
ADA to make the non-discrimination mandate unmistakably
clear that it applies to the Internet. See Latresa McLawhorn,
Comment, Recent Development: Leveling of the Accessibility Play-
ing Field: Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, 3 N.C. J. LAW &
TECH. 63, 75 (2001). This Comment finds that Title III al-
ready applies to the Internet and thus, the argument for
amending the statute is not applicable here..
25 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213 (2000); see also H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2, at 29 (providing numerous examples of overt
and passive discrimination by employers, state and local gov-
ernments, and places of public accommodation).
26 42 U.S.C. §§12101(a)(2)-(3).
27 Id. §12101 (b).
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vide mechanisms for enforcing the civil rights of
persons with disabilities, discrimination is still per-
vasive. 28 One such area where discrimination is
still pervasive is the Internet.2 9
B. E-Barriers to Internet Accessibility
The Internet is an invaluable resource and an
ever-growing medium. The Internet provides a
forum for efficient information transfer, business
transactions, and communications.30 Recently,
the Supreme Court, in emphasizing the broad
utility of the Internet, stated that "[o] ne can use
the Web to read thousands of newspapers pub-
lished around the globe, purchase tickets for a
matinee at the neighborhood movie theater, or
follow the progress of any Major League Baseball
team on a pitch-by-pitch basis."31 It is fair to say
that the utility of the Internet is so expansive that
it is hard to imagine its potential future uses; "[i] t
is no exaggeration to conclude that the content
on the Internet is as diverse as human thought."3 2
Unfortunately, many individuals are precluded
from utilizing the wealth of the Internet because
of virtual architectural and electronic barriers ("e-
28 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ENFORCING THE ADA: A
STATUS REPORT FROM THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE, at http://www.
ada.gov/janmar03.htm (last modified Mar. 12, 2004) (pro-
viding the most recent enforcement activities of the ADA by
the Department of Justice).
29 Compare H. STEPHEN KAYE, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION,
DISABILITY AND THE DIcITAL DIVIDE, (2000) [hereinafter DISA-
BILITY AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE] (finding that only 9.9% of
persons with disabilities, as compared to 38.1% of non-dis-
abled persons, connected to the Internet in the year 2000),
with The Growing Digital Divide, supra note 7 (discussing the
difficulty in determining the number of persons with disabili-
ties that are precluded from using the Internet, essentially
because they are precluded from using the Internet and can-
not be counted).
30 See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U. S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, E-STATS, E-COMMERCE 2001 HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2003).
The Census Bureau brief states that "e-commerce out-
performed total economic activity in three of four major eco-
nomic sectors measured between 2000 and 2001." Id.
31 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002).
32 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997) (internal
quotations omitted).
33 See generally, Cynthia D. Waddell, Applying the ADA to the
Internet: A Web Accessibility Standard, at http://www.icdri.org/
CynthiaW/applying.the adato the internet.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 25, 2004); see also Leo Valdes, Accessibility on the In-
ternet, at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/disaccO0.
htm (last modified Dec. 24, 2003) (discussing the problem of
website accessibility); see also Amy M. Kautzman, Virtuous, Vir-
tual Access: Making Web Pages Accessible to People with Disabilities,
SEARCHER, at http://www.infotoday.com/searcher/jun98/
story3.htm (June 1998) (presenting an overview of the prob-
barriers"). 53 E-barriers are pervasive in the cur-
rent structure of the Internet.3 4 The National
Center for the Research and Dissemination of Dis-
ability Research, in examining the accessibility of
the Internet for persons with disabilities, con-
cludes that the Internet in its current form does
not communicate well to users who may have dif-
ferent needs. 35 The report states that "the use of
graphics, animation, tables, and frames have the
potential unintended consequence of limiting,
rather than expanding, information access on the
Web for some people, such as persons using
screenreaders. ' '3 6 The United States Department
of Commerce has reported that "[t]he transfor-
mation of the Internet from a text-based medium
to a robust multi-media environment has created
a crisis-a growing digital divide in access for peo-
ple with disabilities. '3 7
Opponents of enforcing the application of Title
III to the Internet argue that it would be overly
burdensome on private Internet websites.38 Ex-
perts argue that it is possible, and that there are
ample resources providing services, often free, to
make private websites accessible.3 9 Among these
are the City of San Jose, California, web accessibil-
lem of website accessibility).
34 See generally, Lawrence Lessig, The Laws of Cyberspace,
STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, at http://www.lessig.org/content/art
icles/works/laws-cyberspace.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2004)
(discussing the non-physical architectural barriers to partici-
pation on the Internet).
35 See THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE RESEARCH AND DIS-
SEMINATION OF DISABILITY RESEARCH, WHO NEEDS WEBSITE AG
CESSIBILITY?, THE RESEARCH EXCHANGE, 2 (1998) [hereinafter
WHO NEEDS WEBSITE ACCESSIBILITY?]. The National Center
for the Research and Dissemination of Disability Research is
funded by the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilita-
tion Research (NIDRR), a component of the United States
Department of Education. See NIDRR, DEP'T OF EDUCATION,
at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/nidrr/index.
html (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
36 See WHO NEEDS WEBSITE ACCESSIBILITY?, supra note 35.
37 See The Growing Digital Divide. supra note 7. at 5.
38 See The Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) to Private Internet Sites: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 12
(Feb. 9, 2000) (statement of Dennis C. Hayes, Chairman of
the United States Internet Industry Association) [hereinafter
Hayes Statement] (arguing that "the Internet is an evolving
media, not a physical structure . . . if we apply regulations
based on the technologies and possibilities of today, we may
in fact limit the development of better access tools simply be-
cause we couldn't conceive of them when the regulation was
drafted"); see also Paul Taylor, The Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Internet, 7 B.U.J. ScI. & TECH. L. 26 (2001) (provid-
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ity project and the World Wide Web Consortium
Web Accessibility Initiative. 411 Other resources
providing services for websites seeking accessibil-
ity, such as Bobby, "test web pages and help ex-
pose and repair barriers to accessibility and en-
courage compliance with existing accessibility
guidelines. '" 4 1 The Bobby service, which is spon-
sored by IBM, will either test a website under Sec-
tion 508 guidelines or under W3C "Web Content
Accessibility Guidelines 1.0" based on user prefer-
ence.42 The Bobby site also provides an icon that
can be placed on a website to advertise its accessi-
bility. 43 The Alliance for Technology Access also
provides helpful information on accessibility. 44
The Trace Center, at the College of Engineering
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, provides
useful and free technical assistance on universal
design and accessibility. 45 Nevertheless, experts
on the issue report that the use of graphical web-
sites without textual labels preclude persons who
use screen readers from accessing the site.46 This
concern is amplified in light of the number of in-
dividuals who are precluded from utilizing the In-
40 See The Growing Digital Divide, supra note 7.
41 See Bobby, at http://bobby.watchfire.com/bobby/
html/en/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See generally The Alliance for Technology Access, at
http://www.ataccess.org/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
45 See The Trace Center, at http://tracecenter.org/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2004); see also Jennifer Jones, Users with Disa-
bilities Push High-Tech Limits, INFOWORLD, Sept. 4, 2000, at 37.
46 See The Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) to Private Internet Sites: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong.
(2000) (statement of Dr. Steven Lucas, Senior Vice Presi-
dent, Privaseek, Inc.).
47 See The Growing Digital Divide, supra note 7.
48 See generally, H.R. REP. No. 101485 (offering numer-
ous examples of individuals with disabilities excluded from
mainstream activities and the adverse effects of such discrimi-
nation on those persons and society in general); see also, 42
U.S.C. §12101 (a) (9) (2002) (providing that "the continuing
existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities
for which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the
United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses re-
sulting from dependency and nonproductivity"); see Sally Mc-
Grane, Is the Web Truly Accessible to the Disabled?, CNET.coM
(Jan. 26, 2000) (on file with the author) (providing that 50%
of Americans were online in 2000, that 76% of Americans
with disabilities were online in 2000, and that approximately
98% of websites were inaccessible to disabled persons in
2000); see also Humphrey Taylor, How the Internet is Improving
the Lives of Americans with Disabilities, at http://www.harris
interactive.com/harrispoll/index.asp?PID=93 (June 7,
2000) (providing a survey of 535 adults with disabilities and
ternet's wealth of information and resources. 47
C. Statistical Evidence
Excluding persons with disabilities from using
the Internet is cause for concern. 48 Nearly one-in-
five Americans has one or more mental or physi-
cal disability. 49 Other sources indicate that there
are approximately 750 million people with one or
more disabilities in the world. 50 In 2000, the Cen-
sus Bureau reported that nearly 42% of United
States citizens, sixty-five years and older, had some
type of disability.5 I At that time, 34.7 million peo-
ple were elderly; this number is expected to in-
crease to 69.4 million by the year 2030 as the
baby-boom generation ages. 52
Certainly website inaccessibility does not affect
every person with a disability, but statistics show
that it affects a large number of people, particu-
larly those who are blind.5 3 Although blind per-
sons are most directly affected, website inaccessi-
bility can affect other persons with disabilities. 54
For example, an individual with a mobility impair-
614 adults without disabilities taken between March 22, 2000
and April 5, 2000). The survey finds that on average, adults
with disabilities spend twice as much time on the Internet
than adults without disabilities. Id.
49 JUDITH WALDROP & SHARON M. STERN, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, DISABILITY STATUS: 2000, 2 (2003) [hereinafter
CENSUS 2000 BRIEF]. The census report excludes people in
the military and people who are in institutions. Id.
50 NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, THE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: REACHING SOCI-
ETY'S GOALS, 11 (1994).
51 CENSUS 2000 BRIEF, supra note 49. The percentage is
equivalent to almost 14 million Americans. The census re-
port excludes people in the military and people who are in
institutions. Id.
52 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ACING IN THE UNITED STATES-
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, at http://www.census.gov/ipc/
prod/97agewc.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2004). Because disa-
bility often comes with age, and because the Baby-boom gen-
eration is increasingly dependent on the Internet, website ac-
cessibility is an investment in our future. Id.
53 NAT'L FED'N FOR THE BLIND, BLINDNESS STATISTICS, at
http://www.nfb.org/stats.htm (last modified Oct. 30, 2002)
[hereinafter BLINDNESS STATISTICS]. The World Health Or-
ganization, in 1994, estimated that 38 million people around
the world were blind and that there were an estimated 110
million additional cases of low vision. See WORLD HEALTH
ORG. INFO., FACT SHEET N 142, BLINDNESS AND VISUAL DISA-
BILITY, at http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/factl42.html (Feb.
1997). The Fact Sheet provides that "[t]he estimated world-
wide prevalence of blindness is 0.7%, ranging from 0.3% in
the Established Market Economies and Former Socialist
Economies of Europe to 0.6% in China to 1% in India to
1.4% in Sub-Saharan Africa." Id.
54 See Screen Readers and the Web, supra note 1.
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ment may use a screen-reader, equipped with
voice activated devices, to navigate the Internet.
55
Website accessibility also extends beyond affect-
ing persons with disabilities and can affect illiter-
ate populations.56 Accessible features on websites
can open Internet use up to illiterate populations
who may use screen readers.57 Experts argue that
this may in effect reduce illiteracy in the United
States. 58 Moreover, website accessibility extends
even further beyond assisting persons with disabil-
ities and illiterate populations. 59 Using "Alt" tags
and other text labels benefits other technologies,
such as personal digital assistants ("PDAs") and
cellular telephones with web access. 60 Text-based
language opens the Internet up to low technology
users in other countries through various inter-
faces. 61 Further, using text-based language and
text labels helps facilitate data search engines.
62
Additionally, these accessibility features may serve
as an effective technique for people who are
learning English as a second language.63 Finally,
the use of accessible features can help reduce
work-related injuries.64
It is impossible to determine the exact number
of people precluded from accessing parts of the
Internet and calculating the number would lead
to an understatement of the problem. 65 In the
end, what is important is that many individuals
are precluded from using the Internet because of
e-barriers to access. Much of the problem springs
from confusion in the law as to whether Title III
55 See Screen Readers and the Web, supra note 1.
56 See The Growing Digital Divide, supra note 7, at 4.
57 Id.
58 See SUSAN BRUMMEL TURNBULL, NAT'L INFO. INFRA-
STRUCTURE, PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND THE NII: BREAKING







65 See The Growing Digital Divide, supra note 7.
66 See discussion infra Part II. D.
67 See 42 U.S.C. §§12181-12189 (2000).
68 See id.
69 42 U.S.C. §12182(a) (emphasis added).
70 H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (1990).
71 28 C.F.R. §§36.101-608 (2003).
72 Hayes Statement, supra note 38 ("the Internet is an
evolving media, not a physical structure... if we apply regu-
lations based on the technologies and possibilities of today,
we may in fact limit the development of better access tools
simply because we couldn't conceive of them when the regu-
lation was drafted."); see also Taylor, supra note 38 (providing
applies to the Internet.66
D. The Status of Title III as Applied to Non-
Physical Places of Public Accommodation
Title III prohibits discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities in the provision of goods and
services by commercially operating entities. 67 En-
tites covered under Title III are public accommo-
dations, commercial facilities, and certain educa-
tional facilities offering examinations and
courses.68 The confusion stems from the language
"places of public accommodation" within Title III
and whether that relates to non-physical places. 69
Despite the broad language of Title III, its legis-
lative history, 70 and its regulations, 71 some argue
that the non-discrimination mandate only applies
to physical places of public accommodation. 72
The issue of whether Tide III applies to non-phys-
ical places of public accommodation has been ex-
amined most often in the context of insurance in
federal circuit court adjudications, which focus on
the broad issue of whether Title III is limited to
physical places and there is a conflict among the
circuits.73 The federal courts that hold Title III is
limited to physical places base their rationale on
Congress' enumeration of solely physical places
or its failure to otherwise mention any non-physi-
cal place in the statute.74 The other federal courts
hold that Title III is not limited to mere physical
places. 75 Despite the conflict, only one district
arguments against the application of Title III to the In-
ternet).
73 See Kelly E. Konkright, Comment, An Analysis of the Ap-
plicability of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act to Pri-
vate Internet Access Providers, 37 IDAHO L. REv. 713 (2001)
[hereinafter Konkright]; see also Nor LIMITED TO ACTUAL
PHYSICAL STRUCTURES, 4 AMS. WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE
AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL §31 (Aug. 2003) (discussing fed-
eral court interpretations of Title III as applied to the In-
ternet).
74 See Konkright, supra note 73, for a discussion of fed-
eral court interpretations of whether a public accommoda-
tion is limited to a physical place in the insurance context.
See e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 614 (3d
Cir. 1998) (holding that public accommodations are limited
to physical places); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d
1006, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that public accommo-
dations are limited to physical structures).
75 See, e.g., Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Whole-
saler's Ass'n. of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 26 (1st Cir.
1994) (holding that places of public accommodation are not
limited to physical structures); cf Doukas v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 425-26 (D.N.H. 1996) (holding that a
public accommodation cannot deny a person with a disability
the services or goods it would provide non-disabled patrons).
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court case, decided in 2000, specifically discusses
whether Title III applies to the Internet, and it
held in the negative.7 6 The most promising case
on the issue was filed by the National Federation
for the Blind against America Online, 7 7 alleging
that the Internet service was inaccessible for blind
users; however, the case settled out of court in
2000.
78
Courts holding that Title III does not apply to
the Internet conflict with the position of the De-
partment of Justice. In 1996, after United States
Senator Harkin of Iowa received a constituent let-
ter concerning whether the ADA applied to the
Internet, he sought guidance from the Depart-
ment of Justice. 79 In response, the Department of
Justice issued an advisory letter stating that enti-
ties covered by the ADA "are required to provide
effective communication, regardless of whether
they generally communicate through print media,
audio media, or computerized media, such as the
Internet."' 0 The Department of Justice has also
submitted an amicus brief opinion in the Court of
But cf, Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 564 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding that Title III prohibits public accommo-
dations from denying access to goods and services but does
not regulate the content or substance of the goods or ser-
vices.).
76 See Access Now v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp.
1312, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that an airline Internet
website is not a place of public accommodation within the
meaning of Title III).
77 See Carl S. Kaplan, Is Cyberspace a 'Public Accommoda-
tion'?, N.Y. TIMES CYBER L.R. at http://www.nytimes.com/
library/tech/99/ 11 /cyber/cyberlaw/121aw.html (Nov. 12,
1999) (discussing the filing of suit by the National Federation
of the Blind against America Online and the implications of
website inaccessibility); see also Pamela Mendels, U.S. Law
Aims at Helping Disabled, NY TIMES, at http://www.nytimes.
com/library/tech/99/1 1/cyber/articles/12access.html
(Nov. 12, 1999) (discussing the suit filed by the National Fed-
eration of the Blind's against America Online and the prob-
lem of website accessibility).
78 See Complaint of National Federation of the Blind,
Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind et. al. v. Am. Online, Inc.,
99CV12303EFH (D. Mass 1999) at http://www.education-
rights.org/homenfbvaol.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2004); see
also, National Federation of the Blind/America Online Ac-
cessibility Agreement, Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind et. al. v. Am.
Online, Inc., 99CV12303EFH (D. Mass 1999), at http://www.
nfb.org/Tech/accessibility.htm (Jul. 26, 2000); see also, Bar-
bara Pierce, NFB Sues AOL, THE BRAILLE MONITOR, at http://
www.nfb.org/bm/bm99/bm991201.htm (Dec. 1999).
79 See Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, to the Honorable Tom Har-
kin, United States Senate, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/foia/
tal712.txt (Sept. 9, 1996) [hereinafter DOJ LETTER] (contain-
ing the text of Senator Harkin's constituent's letter as well as
the text of Senator Harkin's letter to the Department ofJus-
tice).
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in favor of Title III
applicability to the Internet.8 1 Nonetheless, the
conflict among circuits concerning whether Title
III is limited to physical places still exists,8 2 and
questions remain as to whether Title III applies to
the Internet.83 These issues have created unfortu-
nate economic and social restrictions on the digi-
tal market which beg their resolution before the
Supreme Court.8 4
III. ARGUMENTS FOR APPLYING TITLE III
TO THE INTERNET
This Part discusses the arguments for and
against making the Internet accessible for persons
with disabilities. Part III examines whether the
plain language of Title III applies to non-physical
places such as the Internet. It contends that Title
III has applied to non-physical places since its pas-
sage in 1990 and that Congress has the authority
to regulate Internet commerce because discrimi-
nation against persons with disabilities on the In-
80 See id. The letter states that "[t]he Internet is an excel-
lent source of information and . . . people with disabilities
should have access to it as effectively as people without disa-
bilities." Jd. It also states that "covered entities that use the
Internet for communications regarding their programs,
goods, or services must be prepared to offer those communi-
cations through accessible means." Id.
81 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Appellant, Hooks v. OKBridge, Inc., 252 F.3d 208
(5th Cir. 2000) (mem.) (arguing that a company that offers
services solely on the Internet is subject to the public accom-
modations provision of Title III).
82 See Konkright, supra note 73; see also supra notes 74-76.
83 Compare Taylor, supra note 38 (arguing that Title III
does not apply to the Internet, and that a proactive applica-
tion could have the effect of chilling economic incentive and
requiring websites to produce forced speech in violation of
the First Amendment), and Hayes Statement, supra note 38
(arguing that Title III is not the correct piece of legislation to
effectuate website accessibility), with Konkright, supra note
73, and The Applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) to Private Internet Sites: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., at
http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/testimony/bristo_2-17-00.
html (Feb. 17, 2003) (statement of Marca Bristo, Chair, Na-
tional Council on Disability).
84 See U.S. Sup. CT. R. 10(a) (providing that the Supreme
Court will grant certiorari on a matter when courts of appeals
conflict); see also Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 347
(1991) (providing that "[a] principal purpose for which [the
Supreme Court uses] certiorari jurisdiction . . . is to resolve
conflicts among the United States courts of appeals... con-
cerning the meaning of provisions of federal law"). Resolu-
tion and uniformity of the law by the Supreme Court is par-
ticularly compelling in this case because under the current
state of affairs, private Internet websites are subject to liability
in some federal circuits while exempt in others. Id.
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ternet places artificial restraints on the market.
Furthermore, Title III does not offend the First
Amendment, but strengthens its essential func-
tions.
A. Whether Title III Applies to the Internet:
Facial Examination of the Statute and
Congressional Intent
1. Statutory Interpretation of Title III
Many legal disputes hinge on the interpretation
of one word. Similarly, the issue of whether Title
III applies to non-physical structures amounts to
the interpretation of the word "place."85 Title III's
non-discrimination mandate can be interpreted
in several ways. It is clear that Congress intended
to prohibit public accommodations from discriminat-
ing against the disabled. However, Congress uses
the language "any place of public accommoda-
tion."8 6 Thus, the issue becomes whether Con-
gress intended for "place" to mean solely a physical
place or whether it is inclusive of non-physical
public accommodations.8
7
A fundamental principle of statutory interpreta-
tion is that a statute should be given its plain and
literal meaning unless some ambiguity in the
terms should arise.88 The word "place" may con-
note several meanings. For example, a literal
meaning dictionary search of the word "place" un-
covers, at the minimum, seventeen definitions,
from "[a] n area with definite or indefinite bound-
aries; a portion of space" to "[a] dwelling; a
house" to "[a] locality, such as a town or city."8' 9
The definitions continue, to include 'Job, post, or
position," a "[h]igh rank or status," or "particular
situation or circumstance."90 Looking at the word
85 42 U.S.C. §12182(a) (2000).
86 Id. (emphasis added).
87 Id. (emphasis added). This is the issue or principle of
law in conflict among the federal appellate courts with re-
gard to the application of Title III to the Internet. See cases
and accompanying text supra notes 74-76.
88 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228
(1993) (providing "[w)hen a word is not defined by statute,
we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural
meaning").
89 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1339 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 4th ed., 2000) [here-




93 Id. (emphasis added).
94 See cases cited supra notes 74-76.
"place" in the context of "place of public accom-
modation," it seems that two reasonable interpre-
tations of the word may coexist. A "place of pub-
lic accommodation" could be an "area with defi-
nite . . . boundaries" such as a house or a phar-
macy.91 A "place of public accommodation" could
simultaneously be "an area with . . . indefinite
boundaries; a portion of space" such as the mind
or outer space (although this "place" is arguably
not accommodating to the public).92 Similarly, it
seems that an interpretation of the phrase "place
of public accommodation" that includes cyber-
space does not offend the definition of "[a] n area
with definite or indefinite boundaries; a portion
of space."93 For example, a pharmaceutical drug
distributor on the Internet would be a place where
one could purchase prescription drugs, although
one need not actually enter a physical structure to
get there. Similarly, one may purchase airline
tickets at a travel agent's office or online, where
entrance into the physical travel office is not nec-
essary or possible.
There is clearly an ambiguity as to whether a
place as used in Title III is limited to physical
places. This is further evidenced by the difficulty
that federal courts have had in determining
whether Congress' definition of a "place" is exclu-
sive of non-physical places.94 Therefore, it is nec-
essary to examine the remainder of the statutory
language to determine congressional intent.
Title III provides examples of public accommo-
dations. 95 While all of the places listed are physi-
cal places, several have language indicating that
there could be other entities not specifically enu-
merated in the category, but within the scope of
the list.96 For example, public accommodations
95 42 U.S.C. §12181(7) (2000).
96 The legislative history to the ADA provides that the
"12 listed categories are exhaustive." H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. 3 at 54 (1990) (emphasis added). However, the legislative
history provides that, within each category, the examples
listed are "only a representative sample of the types of enti-
ties covered under this category" and that "[o]ther retail or
wholesale establishments selling or renting items, such as a
book store, videotape rental store, or pet store, would be a
public accommodation under this category." It is important
to note that the legislative history provides the following:
[A] person alleging discrimination does not have to
prove that the entity being charged with discrimination
is similar to the examples listed in the definition. Rather,
the person must show that the entity falls within the
overall category. For example, it is not necessary to show
that ajewelry store is like a clothing store. It is sufficient
that the jewelry store sells items to the public. (emphasis
[Vol. 12
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include "a motion picture house, theater, concert
hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition;" as well as
"an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or
other place of public gathering.'9 7 Furthermore, pub-
lic accommodations include "a bakery, grocery
store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping
center, or other sales or rental establishment," as well
as "a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop,
beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, fu-
neral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant
or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, profes-
sional office of a health care provider, hospital, or
other service establishment."98 Continuing, public ac-
commodations include "a museum, library, gal-
lery, or other place of public display or collection;" as
well as "a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place
of recreation" and "a nursery, elementary, secon-
dary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private
school, or other place of education."99 Finally, in-
cluded within the statutory definition of a public
accommodation is "a day care center, senior citi-
zen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment" and
"a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf
course, or other place of exercise or recreation."10 0
Clearly, private Internet websites could encom-
pass several of these areas. The Internet can be a
"place of exhibition," a "place of public gather-
ing," a "sales or rental establishment," a "service
establishment," a "place of public display or col-
lection," a "place of recreation," and a "place of
education."'' 1 One may access the Internet to
watch the daily news, to chat with friends, to rent
a DVD, or to attend class. Certainly, these activi-
ties can be construed as types of recreation, ser-
vice or exhibition and whether the accessing of
added).
Id.
97 42 U.S.C. §§12181 (7) (C), (D) (emphasis added).
98 Id. §§12181(7)(E), (F) (emphasis added).
99 Id. §§12181(7)(H)-(J) (emphasis added).
100 Id. §§12181(7)(K), (L) (emphasis added).
101 Id. §§12181(7)(A)-(L).
102 See Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 612 (1927)
(discussing the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"
in that a statute with enumerations impliedly excludes things
not enumerated in the statute); see also Robert J. Gregory,
Overcoming Text in an Age of Textualism: A Practitioners Guide to
Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L. REv. 451
(2000) (discussing avenues of statutory interpretation).
103 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 (1990); see also Non-
discrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommo-
dations and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544,
35,551 Uuly 26, 1990) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Article of Drug . . . Bacto-
these materials is for education, recreation, or
some other reason, the Internet is one place in
which to do it.112
The matter is of hierarchy here. The enumera-
tion of the twelve categories of places of public
accommodation at first glance seemingly excludes
all things not enumerated. However, it is clear
from the language of the statute, as well as the leg-
islative history and regulations, that each category
is not in itself exhaustive.11 3 It is clear that the
enumerations within each category are only exam-
ples of things within the categorical class. Thus,
the language used in Title III's specific enumera-
tions, pointing to "other places," necessarily ne-
gates the application of the maxim "expressio
unius est exclusio alterius" within each category,
although it may be applied to the twelve enumer-
ated categories, where there is no possibility of a
thirteenth category.
Another fundamental principle of statutory in-
terpretation is that ambiguous statutes, specifi-
cally remedial statutes, should be given liberal
construction consistent with the statute's pur-
pose. 10 4 Section 302(b)(2)(A) of the ADA ex-
plains the meaning of the term "discrimination"
as used in Section 302(a). Specifically, Section
302 (b) (2) (A) (iv) provides that discrimination in-
cludes among other things, "a failure to remove
architectural barriers, and communication barri-
ers that are structural in nature . . . where such
removal is readily achievable."1 0 5 Clearly, Con-
gress was concerned that persons with disabilities
were being discriminated against due to the exis-
tence of architectural barriers and communica-
tions barriers. 10 6 Since communication barriers
extend beyond the physical world, it is logical to
Unidisk .... 394 U.S. 784, 799 (1969) (providing that reme-
dial statutes should be afforded liberal interpretations to ef-
fectuate their ends).
105 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
106 Title IV of the ADA ("Title IV") amended Title II of
the Communications Act of 1924, 47 U.S.C. §§201-231, 225
(2000), to require the implementation of telecommunica-
tions services for hearing-impaired and speech-impaired indi-
viduals by common carriers engaged in interstate and intra-
state commerce by wire or radio. Title IV requires that tele-
communications services engaged in wire or radio communi-
cation provide telecommunications relay services that pro-
vide persons using TDD machines the ability to engage in
communication. See 47 U.S.C. §225 (2000). A TDD, as de-
fined by Title IV, is a "Telecommunication Device for the
Deaf, which is a machine that employs graphic communica-
tion in the transmission of coded signals through a wire or
radio communication system." 47 U.S.C. §225(a)(2).
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conclude that Congress was concerned with dis-
crimination in non-physical places. 107
2. Congressional Intent
To determine the congressional intent of a stat-
ute, principles of statutory interpretation provide
that "[t]he purpose, subject matter, the context,
the legislative history, and the executive interpre-
tation of that statute are aids to construction."' 018
When examining the history of the ADA and the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, it
seems unlikely that Congress would have in-
tended to "invoke the sweep of congressional au-
thority, including the power to ... regulate com-
merce, in order to address the major areas of dis-
crimination faced day-to-day by people with disa-
bilities" in physical places, but then completely
disregard non-physical places. 10 9 Such an inter-
pretation would prohibit a travel agent with an of-
fice in Cleveland, Ohio from discriminating on
107 SeeJohnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 710 n.10
(2000) (providing that the obligation of the Supreme Court
is "to give effect to congressional purpose so long as congres-
sional language does not itself bar that result"); see also Nar-
done v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 339 (1939) (providing
that statutes should be interpreted "so as to effectuate the
policy which Congress has formulated"). Here, Congress is
concerned with discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties and its effects thereof. Furthermore, it is clear that Con-
gress is concerned with architectural and communication
barriers. Because an interpretation of Title III exclusive of
the Internet alters or defeats the purpose of the statute, the
Internet must be included within the scope of Title III. Such
an interpretation is consistent with the requirement of pro-
viding effective communication so as to eliminate communi-
cation barriers.
108 See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605
(1941).
109 42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(4) (emphasis added).
110 Such an interpretation not only defeats the purpose
of Title III, but should be avoided. See Holy Trinity Church v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460-61 (1892) (providing that
"[i]f a literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd,
the act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity" and
"[t]he reason of the law . . . should prevail over its letter").
111 See generally 42 U.S.C. §12182. See also H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. 2, at 101 (1990) (providing "[t]he intent of the
contractual prohibitions of section 302(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii)
[codified as 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii)] is to pro-
hibit a public accommodation from doing indirectly through
a contractual relationship, what it may not do directly").
112 See also 42 U.S.C. §12101 (a) (6) (providing that "cen-
sus data, national polls, and other studies have documented
that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior
status in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially,
vocationally, economically, and educationally") (emphasis ad-
ded). See also 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(8) (providing that the
"Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities
the basis of disability, but would allow an online
travel website to discriminate at will. 10 This ab-
surd result would allow online public accommo-
dations to escape liability, which conflicts with the
numerous provisions of Title III which prohibit
contracting services out to escape liability. 11
Congress was also concerned with the eco-
nomic effects of discrimination on persons with
disabilities.1 12 It found that discrimination "costs
the United States billions of dollars in unneces-
sary expenses resulting from dependency and
nonproductivity." 1 3 In light of its concern with
the dependency and nonproductivity that results
from discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties, it is illogical to assume that Congress would
prohibit physical places from discriminating while
simultaneously exempting non-physical places.' 14
If Congress intended on exempting non-physical
places of public accommodation, it would have
enumerated such an intention."15
When the ADA was passed in 1990, the Internet
are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, inde-
pendent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individu-
als") (emphasis added). See also 42 U.S.C. §12101 (a) (9) (pro-
viding that the "continuing existence of unfair and unneces-
sary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabili-
ties the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pux-
sue those opportunities for which our free society is justifia-
bly famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and non-
productivity") (emphasis added).
'13 42 U.S.C. §12101 (a) (9).
114 See id. §12101(a)(9).
115 See Smith, 508 U.S. at 229 (providing that an expan-
sive statutory term must be given the expansive interpreta-
tion unless Congress similarly provides a limitation). The
Smith Court provides that "[hi ad Congress intended [a] nar-
row construction . . . it could have so indicated. It did not,
and we decline to introduce that additional requirement on
our own." Id. Congress was also concerned with the eco-
nomics of barrier removal on businesses. It is illogical to as-
sume that Congress, concerned with the effect of Title IIl on
businesses, would apply the statute to physical places while
simultaneously exempting non-physical places without specif-
ically enumerating this intention to do so. See generally H.R.
REP. No. 101-485 (providing numerous concerns about the
economic impact of requiring businesses to make changes so
as to accommodate persons with disabilities). Particularly,
Congress was concerned with the economic impact that re-
quired alterations could have on businesses, both large and
small. Therefore, Congress provided for tax credits and tax
deductions for all of the modifications that a business would
be required to make. See 26 U.S.C. §44 (2000) (providing a
maximum tax credit of up to $5,000 per year to help small
businesses recover the costs related to accessibility modifica-
tions); see also 26 U.S.C. §190(c) (2000) (providing a maxi-
mum tax deduction of $15,000 per year for both large and
small businesses to cover the costs of accessibility modifica-
tions.). Whether or not the tax incentives arising from the
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was a very young industry. " 6 However, the youth
of an industry hardly negates the clear legislative
purpose of the ADA. 1 7 As noted, Congress was
concerned that "discrimination against individu-
als with disabilities persists in such critical areas as
... public accommodations, education.... [and]
communication," all three of which are available
via the Internet.' '8 It is illogical to assume that
Congress would pass legislation with the intention
of eliminating discrimination, only in physical
places. The plain language of Title III reveals no
such intent.' ' 9
The Supreme Court has applied similar reason-
ing in a unanimous decision holding that the
ADA, "can be applied in situations not expressly
anticipated by Congress.' 1 20 The following Sec-
tion examines this analogous case, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, and how it ap-
plies to the current problem of Title III and the
Internet.
3. The Yeskey Decision
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination
against persons with disabilities by state and local
governments in the provision of "services, pro-
grams, and activities."'1 2 1 In 1998, the Supreme
Court, presented with a novel question of statu-
tory interpretation, determined that Title II's
non-discrimination mandate applied to places op-
removal of barriers apply solely to physical places is not enu-
merated. If Congress intended on exempting businesses en-
gaged in commerce in the non-physical world, it seems that it
would have done so in relation to the tax incentives. In the
end, history reveals the economic benefits of applying Title
1II. Some businesses, such as Greyhound Bus Lines, argued
that requiring their buses to have wheelchair lifts pursuant to
the ADA would force them into bankruptcy. However, feder-
ally mandated bus accessibility actually increased business for
Greyhound. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Providing Access
to the Future: How the Americans with Disabilities Act Can Remove
Barriers in Cyberspace, 79 DENy. U. L. REv. 199, 225-26 (2001)
(discussing the Greyhound Bus Lines account).
116 See Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes' Internet Timeline v. 6.1, at
http://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 25, 2004) [hereinafter INrrERNET TIMELINE] (provid-
ing a timeline of important events in the history of the In-
ternet). For example, the World Wide Web was not even de-
veloped until 1991. The number of Internet users did not
reach one million until 1992. The United States House and
Senate did not provide information servers on the Internet
until 1994. Traditional online dial-up services such as Com-
puServe, America Online, and Prodigy did not begin to pro-
vide Internet access until 1995.
117 42 U.S.C. §12101(b) (2000).
118 Id. §12101(a)(3). It is clear that the failure to en-
erated by state and local governments that were
not specifically mentioned in the statute. Justice
Antonin Scalia, writing for the unanimous Court
in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,
held that "the plain text of Title II of the ADA
unambiguously extends to state prison inmates,"
despite there being no reference to inmates in
the statute or legislative history.'22 Although the
findings of the ADA enumerate that Congress
found that "discrimination against individuals
with disabilities persists in such critical areas as ...
institutionalization," Title II does not specifically
enumerate state prison inmates. 12- Nonetheless,
the Yeskey Court determined that "the fact that a
statute can be applied in situations not expressly
anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate
ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."12 4
In determining that Title II of the ADA "dem-
onstrates breadth," the Court held that "the plain
text of Title I1 of the ADA unambiguously extends
to state prison inmates."'125 This case is analogous
to Title III's application to the Internet. Al-
though Congress has not specifically enumerated
that discrimination on the Internet is pervasive, it
has recognized the barriers faced by persons with
disabilities "in such critical areas as .. .public ac-
commodations, education,... [and] communica-
tion."'1 6 The Internet's explosive growth and in-
creasing social utility could not have been "ex-
pressly anticipated by Congress,"'1 7 since it was
force Title III as applied to the Internet has great conse-
quences. Whether Congress specifically foresaw these conse-
quences on the Internet is unclear at best. However, Con-
gress clearly foresaw the effects of discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities generally.
119 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§12181-12189 (2000). No-
where in the language of Title III is there a congressional
intent to exclude non-physical places of public accommoda-
tion engaged in commerce from the reach of the statute.
120 Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Sedima, S. P. R. L. v.
Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
121 42 U.S.C. §12132 (2000). Title II provides that
"[s]ubject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Id.
122 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 213.
123 42 U.S.C. §12101 (a) (3).
124 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212 (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479,
499 (1985)).
125 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212-13 (citations omitted).




such a new medium when the ADA was en-
acted. 128 Nor could Congress envision the numer-
ous e-barriers. 29 However, Congress' stated pur-
pose of the ADA, to "provide a clear and compre-
hensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties," is unmistakable and unambiguous. 30
Since the ADA manifests a congressional intent
to extend Tide III to non-physical places such as
the Internet, it becomes necessary to determine
whether such an extension is constitutional-does
Congress possess the power to regulate discrimi-
nation on the Internet?131
B. The Commerce Clause: E-Barriers to the
Free Flow of Commerce and the Regulation
of Ones and Zeros on the Net'3 2
The constitutional principle of "enumerated
powers" commands that "[e]very law enacted by
Congress must be based on one or more of its
powers enumerated in the Constitution." 133 The
principle that "[t]he powers of the legislature are
defined, and limited; and that those limits may
not be mistaken, or forgotten" is as old as the
Constitution itself.13 4 Title III of the ADA relies
on the Commerce Clause as authority for Con-
gress' prohibition of discrimination by places of
public accommodation against persons with disa-
bilities. 135 Specifically, the Constitution provides
128 See generally, INTERNET TiMELINE, supra note 116 (pro-
viding examples of the youth of the Internet in 1990).
129 Id.
130 42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(1).
131 See id. §12101(b)(4). Although Congress provides
the Fourteenth Amendment as an authority to regulate and
prohibit discrimination in addition to the Commerce Clause,
the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to the states, and
thus is not applicable in the discussion here. However, Title
II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination by state and
local governments against persons with disabilities, is author-
ized by the Fourteenth Amendment. An examination of Ti-
de II as applied to the Internet would prove equally useful.
See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(discussing authorities by which Congress may legislate).
132 See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1992) (affording a discussion of binary
code, the language of ones and zeros that a computer uses to
process information).
133 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
134 Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176
(1803) (Marshall, C.J.)).
135 See 42 U.S.C. §12101(b) (4) (providing that Congress
intends to "invoke the sweep of congressional authority, in-
cluding the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment
and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major
area of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabil-
Congress the authority, inter alia, "[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States"'3 6 and
the authority "[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers," namely the power to regu-
late commerce. 3 7 The Supreme Court has con-
sistently upheld Congress's authority, pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, to enact remedial legisla-
tion to prohibit discrimination by private entities
that affect commerce. 38 These cases also deter-
mine the extent of congressional authority to pro-
hibit discrimination by such public accommoda-
tions, even though they may be local in their af-
fectation. 3 9
It is clear that Congress has the authority to
prohibit disability-based discrimination in physi-
cal places of public accommodation. 40 However,
novel questions arise when examining Congress'
power to prohibit discrimination in non-physical
places of public accommodation, such as the In-
ternet.
The central issue is whether Congress' regula-
tion in Title III is the regulation of commerce. The
word commerce, as used in the Commerce Clause,
includes the traffic, movement, and intercourse of
things, but not the manufacturing or producing
of things.1 4 1 It may also include non-commercial
activities, such as the transportation of liquor
across state lines for personal use, 142 kidnap-
ities"). In addressing discrimination against persons with dis-
abilities by private entities, Congress may only do so pursuant
to the Article I Commerce Clause. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment only applies to the states. See generally Morrison, 529 U.S.
at 607, for a discussion of congressional authority to legislate.
136 U.S. CONST. art. I. §8, cl. 3.
137 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18. See also McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 352 (1819) (providing the rule of law
that Congress may regulate activities falling outside the enu-
merated powers to effectuate the enumerated power).
138 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298
(1964) (providing that Congress may prohibit discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin by
public accommodations, whose operations affect com-
merce); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U. S., 379 U.S. 241,
250 (1964) (providing same). See also H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. 3, at 53 (1990) (providing that "[c]ommerce is defined in
the same manner as in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
regarding public accommodations").
139 See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 301; see also Heart of Atlanta,
379 U.S. at 258.
140 See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 677
(2001) (providing that golf courses may not discriminate on
the basis of disability pursuant to Title III).
141 See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
142 See generally United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420 (1919)
(holding the prohibition of the transport of liquor for one's
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ping, 143 and fleeing a state to avoid prosecu-
tion. 144 Although the manufacture of goods is not
in itself interstate commerce, if the shipment of
those goods is destined for interstate commerce,
Congress may regulate it pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause. 145
Congress' intent in eliminating discrimination
pursuant to Title III is to afford persons with disa-
bilities meaningful access to the "goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions" that a place of public accommodation af-
fecting commerce may provide.' 46 More specifi-
cally, the commerce could be the ones and zeros
that makes up the information being transferred
via the Internet, 47 or the electrons that flow
through cable Internet wires,148 or the telephone
lines used to accesses a website. The commerce
could also simply be the information transfer,
which, pursuant to Title I1, must be in a manner
that is accessible by all. In any event, little case
law exists concerning whether Congress may regu-
late Internet communications pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. Only one court has addressed
the issue, which seems to accept the Internet as
within the ambit of the Commerce Clause. 149
own use across state lines within Congress' commerce author-
ity).
143 See generally Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124
(1936) (holding the prohibition on the kidnapping of a
child by a parent without custody within Congress' com-
merce authority).
144 See Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228, 238-39
(6th Cir. 1947) (holding the prohibition of the fleeing from
a state to avoid prosecution within Congress' commerce au-
thority).
145 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124-25
(1941) (holding that Congress may regulate things that it
deems injurious to the public welfare, such as wages, hours
and working conditions to protect interstate commerce).
146 42 U.S.C. §12182(a) (2000).
147 See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
364, 376 (1984) (recognizing radio and television broadcast-
ing as commerce).
148 See FERC v. Miss., 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (holding the
Congressional regulation of interstate power transmission
valid pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
149 Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that Internet communications were
"commerce" within the meaning of the Commerce Clause.
Nonetheless, more concern seems to surround the operation
of the dormant commerce power in relation to states ability
to regulate commerce over the Internet). See, e.g., Daniel A.
Farber, Expressive Commerce in Cyberspace: Public Goods,
Network Effects, and Free Speech, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789,
818-19 (2000) (arguing for a more restrained application of
the dormant Commerce Clause in striking down state In-
ternet regulations).
150 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
The next question is whether Congress' regula-
tion of commerce on the Internet is "among the
several states."' 50 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted this phrase to mean interstate commerce,
such as the prohibition by Congress of the trans-
portation of lottery tickets across state lines. 15 Be-
cause the Internet is accessible in any state, web-
sites are engaged in interstate commerce. 52 It is
commonly understood that when a website is de-
veloped, it will be accessible by people anywhere
in the world.153 From the moment an electron or
a one or a zero is accessible on the web, the site
becomes national and international in scope.
Thus, Congress is regulating Internet communica-
tions in interstate commerce to promote accessi-
bility and eliminate discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities.
Congress may regulate civil rights based upon
the principles of interstate commerce because dis-
crimination against particular groups can have an
artificial restriction on the market and interfere
with the free flow of commerce. 1 54 With the ex-
pansive growth of the Internet, and with the num-
ber of persons with disabilities who seemingly are
151 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363-64 (1903).
This case is also commonly referred to as "The Lottery Case."
152 Moreover, Congress can reach those activities of a
place of public accommodation on the Internet that are in-
trastate if Congress has a rational basis to conclude that such
intrastate activity has a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 280-81 (1981) (holding that Con-
gress could have a rational basis that surface coal mining, a
local activity, has substantial effects on interstate commerce).
Thus, if there are websites that are not interstate in nature,
Congress could have a rational basis for regulating those web-
sites, because they could have substantial effects on interstate
commerce. Nonetheless, intrastate activity on the Web is
probably an irrelevant distinction since any website is gener-
ally accessible by people in almost any part of the country
and even the world. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 (internal quota-
tions omitted) (finding the Internet to be a "unique and
wholly new medium of worldwide communication" that "en-
able[s] tens of millions of people to communicate with one
another and to access vast amounts of information from
around the world").
153 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (internal
quotations omitted) (finding that the Internet "enable[s]
tens of millions of people to communicate with one another
and to access vast amounts of information from around the
world").
'54 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304
(1964) (providing that Congress may prohibit discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin by
public accommodations, whose operations affect com-
merce); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964) (providing same).
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precluded from accessing websites, 1 55 Congress
has a legitimate concern in making websites acces-
sible. Unburdening the free flow of commerce
justifies mandating that places of public accom-
modation on the Internet provide websites that
are accessible by all persons.
Some Internet websites, although engaged in
commerce, may be local, such as a cable operator
providing services to one area within one state.
Such a place of public accommodation provides
goods or services that are somewhat trivial in com-
parison to the vast world of interstate commerce.
The issue then becomes whether Congress may
still regulate these trivial activities. The Supreme
Court has long held that in such instances, Con-
gress may still have the right to regulate local ac-
tivities if, collectively or in the aggregate, they
have (or could have) a real and substantial bur-
den on the free flow of commerce. 15 6 The aggre-
gate effect of allowing all local places of public ac-
commodation on the Internet to discriminate
could have a substantial effect on Congress' au-
thority to regulate commerce because public ac-
commodations could escape liability by providing
purely local activities. 157
Congress has the constitutional authority to
regulate commerce on the Internet.158 The means
of prohibiting discrimination against persons with
disabilities justify the ends of unburdening the
free flow of commerce on the Internet. 59 While it
is clear that Congress has the power to prohibit
discrimination on the Internet, it is necessary to
determine whether the application of Title III to
the Internet violates the First Amendment.
155 See BLINDNESS STATISTICS, supra note 53 (providing
statistical evidence of the e-barrier problem).
156 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942).
157 The Supreme Court recently has limited the scope of
congressional commerce powers, when federal legislation
regulates intrastate activity that is non-economic in nature.
Because the regulation of places of public accommodation
on the Internet is purely economic in nature, these recent
limitations do not apply. See United States v Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 617 (2000); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 566-68 (1995).
158 See, e.g., The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47
U.S.C. §151 (2000).
159 C.f Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 298 (holding that Con-
gress may prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, or national origin by public accommodations,
whose operations affect commerce, as a means to effect the
end of unburdening the free flow of commerce), and Heart of
Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 250 (holding same).
160 See Taylor, supra note 38, at 45 (arguing that the ap-
plication of Title III to private Internet Websites would
C. Whether the Application of Title III to the
Internet Would Offend First Amendment
Jurisprudence: E-Barrier Manner
Restrictions
Opponents of the application of Title III to the
Internet argue that it violates the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution, 160 namely that "Con-
gress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech.' 6 1 Novel questions of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence arise when one considers
whether Congress has the authority to require pri-
vate websites to ensure accessibility for all users.
Since the courts have not addressed this issue, it
can best be addressed by understanding the In-
ternet regulations that have confronted First
Amendment challenges. 16 2
The initial question is whether the non-discrim-
ination mandate of Title III, requiring websites to
be accessible, is a regulation of verbal speech,
non-verbal speech, or non-speech conduct. Here,
classifying Internet speech as either verbal or non-
verbal speech-related conduct depends on the
content of the website. Some websites provide
text only, while others depict activities and con-
duct through pictures. A website could depict
cardboard shacks in a park163 or a person burning
a draft card on courthouse steps.' 64 In either case,
requiring these pictures to include text labels for
accessibility purposes is the congressional regula-
tion of non-verbal speech. Thus, the Internet
contains both forms of verbal and non-verbal
speech. 16 5 This Comment primarily focuses on
non-verbal Internet speech. However, it ulti-
mately shows that non-verbal Internet speech is
amount to "forced speech" and would violate the First
Amendment); see also Hayes Statement, supra note 38 (testify-
ing that "there are serious constitutional implications" aris-
ing from the application of Title III to the Internet). Contra,
Peter David Blanck and Leonard A. Sandier, Feature Article
ADA Title III and the Internet: Technologies and Civil Rights, 24
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 855 (2000) (providing
an analysis of Title III as applied to the Internet subject to
principles of First Amendment jurisprudence).
161 U.S. CONST. amend I.
162 See generally United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539
U.S. 194 (2003); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564
(2002); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
163 See, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 289 (holding a regulation
prohibiting sleeping in Lafayette Park, expressive or other-
wise, not a violation of the First Amendment).
164 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
(holding a regulation prohibiting the expressive burning of a
draft card is not a violation of the First Amendment).
165 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-55 (giving a though explana-
tion of the history, structure, and capabilities of the Internet,
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subject to the same test as verbal Internet speech.
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether Title III is regu-
lating verbal or non-verbal speech.16 6
1. The Regulation of Speech Related Conduct: The
Elimination f E-Barriers is Unrelated to the
Suppression of Free Expression
The Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien
provides the test for determining whether a con-
gressional regulation that has the potential of lim-
iting non-verbal speech is "sufficiently justified" to
pass First Amendment scrutiny. 167 The O'Brien
Court states:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is suf-
ficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest; if the governmental in-
terest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.1
68
First, the Court in O'Brien examines the statute
under the third element, namely whether "the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
and providing examples of verbal and non-verbal speech con-
duct).
166 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (examining the burn-
ing of a draft card as non-verbal speech related conduct, but
ultimately deciding the case as though it were verbal speech).
167 Id. at 376-77.
168 Id.
169 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; see also Texas v.Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 407 (1989) ("[i]n order to decide whether O'Brien's
test applies ... we must decide whether [the regulation] ...
is unrelated to the suppression of expression."). The
O'Brien Court has recited a number of adjectives "[t]o char-
acterize the quality of the governmental interest which must
appear;" among these are "compelling; substantial; subordi-
nating; paramount; cogent; strong." See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
376-77 (1968).
170 We assume here that Title III applies to the Internet.
See discussion supra, Part III.A.
171 See 42 U.S.C. §§12101(a)(1)-(9) (2000) (providing
the findings and purposes of the ADA. Specifically, Congress
found that the "continuing existence of unfair and unneces-
sary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabili-
ties the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pur-
sue those opportunities for which our free society is justifia-
bly famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and non-
productivity").
172 See id. §§12101(a)(1)-(2).
173 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
174 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J.) (dissenting and borrowing from John Milton's
"Areopagitica" (1644) and John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty"
(1859)). Justice Holmes states in his Abrams dissent:
But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
sion of free expression."' 69 The governmental in-
terest in Title III is the elimination of discrimina-
tion against persons with disabilities on the In-
ternet,' 7°) and specifically, by places of public ac-
commodation.' 7 1 Congress is concerned that per-
sons with disabilities will be precluded from acces-
sing public accommodations in a manner similar
to non-disabled persons, whether or not they are
on the Internet. 72 This interest is "unrelated to
the suppression of free expression"' 73 because it
expands the "Marketplace of Ideas" by allowing
equal access for all individuals. 174 This is clear
from the plain language of the ADA, 17 5 as well as
its legislative history.176 Thus, Congress' interest
in codifying Title III is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression, but is related to eliminat-
ing discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties. In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
the Supreme Court explains that O'Brien's other
three elements are "little, if any, different from
the standard applied to time, place, or manner re-
strictions."177
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market .... That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experi-
ment.
Id.
175 See 42 U.S.C. §12101.
176 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22-3 (1990). The
Legislative History provides:
The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and com-
prehensive national mandate to end discrimination
against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons
with disabilities into the economic and social main-
stream of American life; to provide enforceable stan-
dards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities, and to ensure that the Federal government
plays a central role in enforcing these standards on be-
half of individuals with disabilities.
Id.
177 Clark, 468 U.S. at 298. It is clear that Title III is not
concerned with the regulation of the content of e-speech,
such as obscenity or defamation on the Internet. See Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 376
U.S. 254 (1964). Nor is Title III concerned with regulating
sexually explicit material that might be accessible to minors
on the Internet. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
Title III is concerned with eliminating discrimination against
persons with disabilities in the accessing of public accommo-
dations operating in commerce on the Internet. See 42
U.S.C. §§12181-12189. Therefore, Title III is a regulation of




2. Title III As Applied to the Internet: Content
Restrictions or Time, Place or Manner Restrictions
on E-Speech
To determine the level of scrutiny Internet
speech regulations get pursuant to time, place,
and manner principles, we must determine first in
which categorical forum the Internet falls. Differ-
ent levels of scrutiny are applied to time, place,
and manner restrictions depending on the forum
where it takes place, and several forums exist.17
The most restrictive are the traditional and desig-
nated public fora, which receive strict scrutiny
analysis. 179 Conversely, Congress has the authority
to regulate in non-public and private fora so long
as the regulation has a rational basis. 180
The Supreme Court has not yet decided the fo-
rum in which the Internet falls for purposes of
time, place, and manner restrictions. However,
the Court recently has shed light on the place-
ment of the Internet.18 1 In United States v. Ameri-
can Library Association, the Court refused to apply
traditional public forum and designated public fo-
rum principles to a public library that provides In-
ternet access.18 2 The Court avoided the issue of
whether the Internet in itself is a traditional pub-
lic forum, a designated public forum, a non-pub-
lic forum, or a private forum.'8 3 The Court stated,
"we would hesitate to import the public forum
doctrine ... wholesale into the context of the In-
ternet... [w]e are wary of the notion that a par-
178 Compare Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S.
496, 515-16 (1939) (holding streets, sidewalks, and parks as
being traditional public fora), and Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-96
(1993) (holding school rooms opened for after-school meet-
ings by social, civic, and recreation groups to be a designated
public forum), with Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-81 (1992) (holding an airport to be a
nonpublic forum), and U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Green-
burgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 131-35 (1981) (holding a
mailbox to be a private forum).
179 See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16 and Lamb's Chapel, 508
U.S. at 394-96. Government regulations of public fora de-
mand that the regulation be content neutral, which means
they must be viewpoint neutral, subject matter neutral, and
speaker neutral. Furthermore, regulations of public fora
must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest and must leave open ample alternative means of ex-
pressing the speech. Id.
180 See Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 679-
81 and Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 131-35.
Government regulations of nonpublic and private fora de-
mand that the regulation be viewpoint neutral and reasona-
bly related to a legitimate government interest.
181 See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S.
tial analogy in one context, for which we have de-
veloped doctrines, can compel a full range of de-
cisions in such a new and changing area."' 8 4 Al-
though the Internet-forum issue for purposes of
First Amendment jurisprudence has not yet been
resolved, it seems that the Court has ruled out a
public forum application. We will assume, in light
of American Library Association, that the Internet is
either a non-public forum or a private forum.'8 5
Nevertheless, this Comment will also analyze Tide
III under the public forum doctrine, which will
show that ultimately, the statute passes both ra-
tional basis and strict scrutiny review under the
First Amendment.
3. Non-Public and Private Fora: Rational Basis
Review
First Amendment jurisprudence holds that
Congress may regulate the manner of speech in
non-public and private fora if the regulations are
viewpoint neutral and are reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.'8 6 Here, Con-
gress' stated intent of eliminating discrimination
against persons with disabilities is viewpoint neu-
tral because it does not regulate in favor of one
viewpoint over another.18 7 It promotes all view-
points, only requiring that persons with disabili-
ties have access to the website if it is provided on





183 Id at 231-234. The Court did, however, reject the no-
tion that Internet access in a public library could neither be a
traditional or designated public forum. Id. The Court has not
yet made a per se classification of Internet forum placement.
184 Id. at 233 n.3 (internal quotations omitted) (citation
omitted) (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996)). The American Library
Association Court's rejection of Internet access in a public li-
brary as not being a public forum seems to suggest that the
Internet in and of itself does not fall within the public forum
doctrine.
185 See Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 538 U.S. at 232-233.
186 See, e.g., U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (discussing the applica-
tion of First Amendment principles to nonpublic fora, specif-
ically applying the rational basis test).
187 Title III does not provide that only persons with disa-
bilities may express opinions while simultaneously proscrib-
ing the viewpoint of non-disabled individuals. Title III is not
interested in proscribing any particular message, but in al-
lowing all messages to be communicated.
188 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§12181-12189 (2000). Title III
does not favor one viewpoint over another. Title III requires
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Furthermore, Title III is reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental purpose because Con-
gress found that "historically, society has tended
to isolate and segregate individuals with disabili-
ties, and, despite some improvements, such forms
of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem." 18 9 Affirmative legislation such as the
ADA brings persons with disabilities into main-
stream activities and reduces dependency and
nonproductivity, a reasonable Congressional en-
deavor. 190 Congress has a legitimate governmen-
tal interest in preventing discrimination in places
of public accommodation, 19' and requiring web-
sites to eliminate e-barriers is a reasonable way to
effectuate that purpose. 192
4. Public Fora: Strict Scrutiny
Even if Title III, as a regulation of the manner
of speech, was analyzed as a traditional public fo-
rum or designated public forum, the result would
be the same. Congress may only regulate a public
forum if the regulation is content neutral, mean-
private Internet websites to provide text labels, "Alt" tags, and
other identifying information that allow peripheral devices,
such as screen readers, to successfully navigate the site. The
website publisher reserves complete discretion in the content
or substance of the text label or "Alt" tag. Title III's mandate
does not require a private Internet website to provide a view-
point-biased text label or "Alt" tag. Therefore, Title III does
not favor a particular viewpoint over another. Analogically,
requiring a website to include certain language to make it
navigable by persons with disabilities is similar to requiring
that a website incorporate a particular type of code so that a
particular web browser may access the site. It is not the con-
tent or substance of the code that is being regulated but the
form or manner. Id.
189 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(2); see also id. §12101(b)(4)
(Congress has made it clear in the purposes section of the
ADA that it intends to "invoke the sweep of congressional
authority, including the power to enforce the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment and to regulate commerce, in order to ad-
dress the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities").
190 See id. §12101 (a) (9).
191 See discussion supra Part III.B, finding discrimination
against persons with disabilities as placing artificial restraints
on the market that interfere with the free flow of commerce.
192 See 42 U.S.C. §12101(a). The elimination of e-barri-
ers is, at the very least, reasonable because it helps defray the
costs of dependency and nonproductivity borne by the
United States.
193 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-20 (1988). Title
III, in requiring private Internet websites to add text labels to
pictures, graphics, and hyperlinks, does not require the web-
site to implement any particular content or substance. Title
III only requires the addition of information in a manner
ing the regulation must be viewpoint neutral, sub-
ject matter neutral, and speaker neutral.1 93 As
stated previously, Title III is viewpoint neutral be-
cause it does not regulate in favor of one view-
point over another. 94 Title III is subject matter
neutral because it does not regulate in favor of
one subject over another; it simply requires a web-
site to discuss a subject in a manner that is accessi-
ble to persons with disabilities. Finally, Title III is
speaker neutral because it does not regulate in
favor of one speaker over another.
Strict scrutiny also requires that congressional
regulations of public fora be narrowly tailored'9 5
to serve significant government interests, 196 leav-
ing open ample alternative means to communi-
cate speech. 197 Clearly, the elimination of discrim-
ination against persons with disabilities to unbur-
den commerce and to allow persons with disabili-
ties to live independent lives constitutes such sig-
nificant government interests.198 Furthermore, Ti-
tle III is narrowly tailored to meet this end be-
cause it does not burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to effectuate the end of
that makes it usable to all. It does not ask the website pro-
vider to take a stance on a particular subject or viewpoint. It
also does not favor one speaker's Internet speech in favor of
another. Private Internet websites reserve the right to en-
code graphics, tables, and hyperlinks with whatever Internet
speech deemed to be fitting. Title III simply requires a web-
site generating Internet speech must do so in a manner ac-
cessible by persons with disabilities. Of course, Title III's
content neutral regulations only apply to those private In-
ternet websites fitting within the statutory definition of a
place of public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. §12182. See
also discussion infra, Part III.A.
194 See supra Part III.C.3. Viewpoint neutral for rational
basis is the same test applied to determine whether a regula-
tion is viewpoint neutral for purposes of strict scrutiny.
195 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803
(1989) (holding that a law requiring persons performing at a
city's theater to use the city's sound equipment as being nar-
rowly tailored to the city's interest in preventing excessive
noise).
196 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729 (2000) (hold-
ing constitutional a state law prohibiting persons within 100
feet of a health care facility from approaching those seeking
access to the facility, because access to health care facilities
was a significant government interest).
197 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (hold-
ing that picketing in the street in front of a single household
left open ample alternative means for the picketers to walk
through the neighborhood). Cf supra Section III.C.3 (as-
suming the Internet is a non-public or private forum, apply-
ing rational basis review, and concluding that Title III is a
viewpoint neutral regulation of Internet speech that is rea-
sonably related to a legitimate governmental interest).
198 See generally 42 U.S.C. §12101.
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website accessibility. 199 Finally, a website has am-
ple alternative means of expressing speech if it
were unable to make accessible modifications for
some reason.2" 0° In the end, Title III in no way re-
quires a website provider to implement any partic-
ular content on a website, but does require a web-
site, operating in commerce, to provide speech in
a manner that is equally accessible to persons with
disabilities.
Some opponents argue that requiring websites
to provide the language, such as "Alt" tags, or
links to text-only sites, to make websites accessible,
amounts to "forced speech." 20 1 They argue that
this mandate indirectly affects the content of
speech, because websites must use valuable re-
sources to make the accommodations, instead of
using the money to make potential speech. 20 2
However, First Amendment jurisprudence clearly
holds that Congress may regulate speech so long
as it survives the applicable level of scrutiny. As is
shown here, Title III is a valid regulation of the
Internet subject to rational basis review, and in
the alternative, strict scrutiny. Therefore, even if
private Internet websites are subjected to "forced
speech," Congress may do so without offending
the First Amendment. Nevertheless, questions re-
main as to whether the application of Title III to
the Internet would prove to be overbroad or
vague.
5. Precision of Title II As Applied to the Internet:
Overbreadth and Vagueness
The First Amendment does not guarantee un-
bridled protection in the delivery of speech, and
Congress may regulate speech so long as the regu-
199 See generally Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (provid-
ing a discussion of strict scrutiny for time, place, or manner
restrictions).
20 This is similar to the picketing regulation in Frisby,
487 U.S. at 483, where picketers could not focus their speech
in front of a particular residence, but they had the alternative
to picket throughout the neighborhood streets.
201 See Taylor, supra note 38, at 45 (arguing that requir-
ing Websites to make accommodations amounts to "forced
speech" in that it would limit Web space and server capacity
for the delivery of information").
202 See id. at 42. The potential speech would be the
speech that the Internet public accommodation would ex-
pend resources on if disability related speech were not re-
quired. Arguably, this potential speech is de minimus.
203 See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981).
204 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999)
(holding a Chicago loitering ordinance impermissibly
lation is reasonable.20 3 According to the Supreme
Court, imprecise laws can be attacked on their
face on two grounds: overbreadth and vague-
ness.204 Thus, a complete facial analysis of a man-
ner statute, such as Title III, requires an examina-
tion of overbreadth and vagueness.
The overbreadth doctrine "permits the facial
invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of
First Amendment rights if the impermissible ap-
plications of the law are substantial when judged
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." 20 5 This constitutional doctrine is judicially
created and its purpose is to prevent the chilling
of protected speech. 20 6 The overbreadth doctrine
is applied to time, place, and manner restrictions
to ensure that the regulations do not sweep more
broadly than necessary. 20 7 In the context of a non-
public forum, overbreadth of a viewpoint neutral
regulation reasonably related to achieving impor-
tant governmental interests turns on whether Ti-
tle III has alternative means of communication.
Here, Title III leaves open ample alternatives for
websites to provide commercial information,
products, or services because websites are not pro-
hibited from selling goods over the Internet; they
merely are required to fashion the distribution in
a manner that is accessible to all. Although web-
sites might be required to add extra information,
such as text labels, this information is the extent
of Title III's restriction (if this is even a restriction
on speech). Although the additions of text-labels
may have some trivial or de minimus burden on
the amount of web speech, it is not unduly bur-
densome and clearly not substantial since the eco-
nomic benefits outweigh the economic bur-
dens.20 Furthermore, Title III does not prohibit
vague).
205 Id. at 52 (internal quotations omitted).
206 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.8 (1980) (providing
that "[t]he overbreadth doctrine derives from the recogni-
tion that unconstitutional restriction of expression may deter
protected speech by parties not before the court and thereby
escape judicial review"); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 60, 612-131 (1973).
207 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
208 Nor is the requiring of private Internet websites to be
accessible a restriction on the creativity of a website. Al-
though website accessibility requires the use of text labels
and "Alt" tags, this does not mean that websites must aban-
don visual and aesthetic creativity. Changes to websites, so as
to facilitate their accessibility, are hidden within the code of
the website. See Judy Heim, Locking out the Disabled, PC
WORLD, Sept. 2000, at 181 (providing that misunderstandings
of the implementations that accessible websites require leads
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speech, it amplifies it. Since Title III does not
burden more speech than is necessary to accom-
plish the ends of Internet accessibility, Title III is
not overbroad in application.
The vagueness doctrine prohibits legislation
that lacks sufficient clarity to provide adequate
guidance on the application of the law.21 1° 1 Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, "the principal inquiry
is whether the law affords fair warning of what is
proscribed." 21 1 Clearly, discrimination against
persons with disabilities by places of public ac-
commodation engaged in commerce is pro-
scribed by Title 111.211 Such activity has been pro-
scribed by Title III since 1990. Furthermore,
there is no evidence that Tide III's application to
the Internet has resulted in a chilling effect on
Internet speech, whereby private Internet web-
sites are afraid to generate web speech subject to
unclear notice. 212
The application of Title III in its current form
does not offend First Amendment jurisprudence.
Title III is a regulation of the manner of speech
where Congress has a legitimate, if not substantial
concern, in eliminating discrimination and Title
III is a reasonable method of effectuating this
concern. Furthermore, Title III is not overbroad
because it does not include a substantial number
of impermissible applications. Title III is also
valid under the vagueness doctrine because it puts
places of public accommodation on notice that
discrimination against persons with disabilities is
unlawful.
III. CONCLUSION
It is clear from the plain meaning of the statute
and the intent of Title III that the Internet is
within the scope of its regulation. A contrary
reading of the statute would foster the illogical re-
sult that Congress intended to prevent discrimina-
tion in all places of physical locale while simulta-
to misconceptions that website creativity will be compro-
mised. The article provides, borrowing from the HTML
Writers Guild's AWARE Center, which offers essays concern-
ing creating accessible websites, that "Myth no. 1: An accessi-
ble Web page is dull, boring, plain text.").
209 See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982).
210 See id.
211 See 42 U.S.C. §§12181(1), (7) (2000).
212 In this debate, there is no evidence that private In-
ternet websites would rather not emerge in Internet Web-
speaking for commercial purposes than be subject to liability
neously exempting businesses with non-physical
locales. This interpretation has no basis in the
statute.
Additionally, Congress has the power to pro-
hibit discrimination by private Internet websites
pursuant to its commerce power. Congress has
long had the power to prohibit discrimination
pursuant to the Commerce Clause so as to pre-
vent artificial restrictions on the free flow of
goods or services. Congress, in prohibiting dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities,
found that such activity isolates and segregates
such individuals and forces them into depen-
dency. Congress, concerned with the effects of
such isolation and dependency, found it necessary
to legislate. Not only did Congress have a rational
basis for Title III, it had the power to enact such
legislation.
Title III is also well within the bounds of the
First Amendment. Because Title III does not reg-
ulate the content of Internet speech, it is a time,
place, or manner regulation. Whether Title III is
found to be a public or non-public forum is in-
consequential because Tide III meets both stan-
dards of review. Tide III is also specific enough to
avoid invalidation on the basis of vagueness or
overbreadth.
This Comment has shown that Title III applies
to the Internet. Nonetheless, there is a conflict
among the circuits which requires adjudication by
the Supreme Court. Although the most effica-
cious method of making Title III's application un-
mistakably clear would be the amending of the
statute, such activity would raise serious questions
in light of the separation of powers doctrine.
Congress was looking to clarify Title III's applica-
tion in 2000; however, the current posture of the
issue in the judiciary makes congressional activity
improper.2 1 3 Thus, certiorari is the modus oper-
andi for the resolution of the issue of Title III In-
ternet applicability.
under Title Ill. Although there is confusion in the law as to
whether Title III applies to the Internet, the addition of disa-
bility friendly features is as burdensome as using the proper
computer language so anyone can access the website. But cf
Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-51 (1991) (holding
a statute prohibiting attorneys representing clients in a pend-
ing case from making statements that would have a substan-
tial likelihood of prejudicing a trial as void for vagueness be-
cause it does not provide sufficient standards by which to
judge whether statements are illegal).
213 See generally Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503
U.S. 429 (1992).
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